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Abstract: The frequent misinterpretation of the nature of confidence intervals by students has
been well documented. This article examines the problem as an aspect of the learning of mathematical
definitions and considers the tension between parroting mathematically rigorous, but essentially
uninternalized, statements on the one hand and expressing imperfect but developing understandings on
the other. A small-scale study among schoolteachers sought comments on four definitions expressing
differing understandings of confidence intervals, and these are examined and discussed. The article
concludes that some student wordings could be regarded as less inaccurate than they might seem at
first sight and presents a case for accepting a wider range of more intuitive understandings as a work
in progress.
Re´sume´: La fre´quente me´sinterpre´tation de la nature des intervalles de confiance de la part des
e´tudiants est bien documente´e. Cet article analyse la question en tant qu’aspect de l’apprentissage des
de´finitions mathe´matiques, et conside`re la diffe´rence entre d’une part la re´pe´tition d’e´nonce´s parfaite-
ment rigoureux sur le plan mathe´matique, mais qui n’ont pas e´te´ inte´gre´s, et d’autre part l’expression
de concepts encore imparfaitement maıˆtrise´s, mais qui de´notent une certaine compre´hension. Une
e´tude re´alise´e aupre`s d’un petit groupe d’enseignants a sollicite´ leurs commentaires au sujet de quatre
de´finitions exprimant diffe´rents degre´s de compre´hension du concept d’intervalle de confiance, com-
mentaires qui ont ensuite fait l’objet d’une analyse et d’une discussion. L’article conclut que certains
e´nonce´s des e´tudiants sont moins inexacts qu’ils ne pourraient sembler a` priori, ce qui sugge`re qu’on
peut accepter une plus vaste gamme d’e´nonce´s intuitifs comme l’expression d’une ‘compre´hension
en devenir’.
Regardless of the text, there is almost invariably a peculiar pair of caveats presented as from on high:
Never accept the alternative hypothesis, and never say the probability is 0.95 that the mean lies in a
95% confidence interval for the mean.
Dillon (2011, p. 34)
INTRODUCTION
It is one thing to assess students’ procedural fluency at a particular mathematical technique, but
it is quite another to attempt to uncover their underlying understanding. Skemp (1976) famously
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contrasted an instrumental understanding of how to get the answer with a more relational
understanding of the bigger picture, including the interconnections between the different elements
in the process. In a related formulation, Sfard (1992) distinguished between operational and
structural approaches to mathematical concepts. A student engages operationally when he or she
is focused on the dynamic process of achieving a particular transformation. The complementary
structural aspect entails awareness of a more static, abstract, reified entity, and this can be difficult
to achieve. Asking students to explain their answer, or the ideas behind it, is one way of attempting
to develop and assess the depth of their understanding, but it may be that explanations that satisfy
the teacher can also be learned off pat, just as easily as recipes for performing some technique.
Being able to prove a geometric theorem, for instance, may indicate a strong grasp of geometry
but, on the other hand, it could simply mean that the student has memorized a proof. Students
may take the pragmatic position that they have to learn a method and then, in addition, learn a
sociomathematically acceptable explanation for the method. The quote attributed to Nietzsche,
“It is hard enough to remember my opinions, without also remembering my reasons for them,”
comes to mind. Mathematical understanding is not supported by students electing to memorize
an explanation to go with a particular mathematical procedure.
The statistical topic of confidence intervals would seem to present an interesting example
of an area where students may adopt a double-speak strategy of thinking in one way privately
but conforming in the classroom to a form of words that is acceptable to the teacher—and that
they hope will ultimately satisfy an examiner. It is common for teachers to characterize students’
informal articulations regarding confidence intervals as evidence of deep-seated misconceptions
and to seek to confront or challenge these by various means so that students can overcome them
(Kalinowski, 2010). However, Smith, diSessa, and Roschelle (1993) charted students’ devel-
opment from views that might be termed misconceptions through to more expert articulations,
taking issue with what they regard as dismissive attitudes towards students’ preexisting ideas.
Adopting a constructivist perspective, they promoted the view that students’ “prior knowledge is
the primary resource for acquiring new knowledge” (p. 151), claiming that:
Persistent misconceptions, if studied in an evenhanded way, can be seen as novices’ efforts to extend
their existing useful conceptions to instructional contexts in which they turn out to be inadequate.
Productive or unproductive is a more appropriate criterion than right or wrong. (p. 147)
In this article, I explore common student explanations of confidence intervals and question the
appropriateness of regarding these as evidence of misconceptions.
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AND THEIR MISINTERPRETATIONS
Many users of statistics have argued that confidence intervals may in certain circumstances be
preferable to hypothesis testing (Gardner & Altman, 1986; Nakagawa & Cuthill, 2007), although
others have disagreed (Poole, 1987). A confidence interval is a way of describing the reliability of
an estimate. A statistician may be interested in the mean (or some other measure) of a population
but, except in rare cases, data will not be available for the entire population and a sample must
be taken instead. When the mean is calculated from a sample, it is unlikely to match precisely
the mean of the entire population, but it can be used as an estimate of the (unknown) population
mean. How good an estimate it is will depend on the size of the sample: other things being equal,
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a bigger sample will give a better estimate for the population mean. Specifying a confidence
interval is more informative than just giving the sample mean, because it provides a band of
values either side of the sample mean. A 95% confidence interval would have a wider band than
a 90% confidence interval for the same data, because the more certain you wish to be about
capturing the population mean, the less tightly you can set the limits. If you repeatedly use 95%
confidence intervals, then on 95% of occasions the population mean will be captured in your
interval—and one time in 20 it will lie outside it.
The precise form of words used to describe this capturing process is the issue at stake in
this article. Anecdotal accounts support the quotation at the beginning that, for many students,
besides the business of learning how to calculate confidence intervals, there is the additional
requirement—frequently presented as little more than examination technique—to express their
interpretation using sociomathematically acceptable language. The reasons for the prohibitions
on certain formulations may be poorly understood by the students, making success a matter more
of social conformity than of mathematical sophistication.
It is widely reported that students (Kalinowski, 2010)—and not just students (Belia, Fidler,
Williams, & Cumming, 2005)—frequently misinterpret confidence intervals. Fidler (2006) found
that university statistics students exhibited a variety of misconceptions in relation to confidence
intervals, and he divided these into definitional (relating to what a confidence interval is) and
relational (to do with “how the various determinants of a [confidence interval] affect each other”;
Fidler, 2006, p. 210). Hagtvedt, Jones, and Jones (2008) reported that “students typically believe
that a given parameter is contained in a confidence interval with a known probability” (p. 53),
commenting that none of the 30 students they tested before they embarked on their teaching was
able to offer what they regarded as a correct interpretation. Robison-Cox (1999) perceptively
characterized the essence of the error as placing confidence in the interval found rather than in
the process by which it is found:
Students mistakenly say “The probability thatµ [the population mean] lies in [7.5, 9.2], the computed
interval, is 0.90” instead of saying “The process by which the interval [7.5, 9.2] was computed yields
intervals which include µ 90% of the time.” (p. 81)
He then went on to describe a practical experiment (repeatedly throwing a tennis ball at a
blackboard) designed to illustrate the meaning of a confidence interval, commenting that “we
do not know if a particular interval has covered the target, we can only have confidence that the
process will cover the hidden target a certain percent of the time in the long run” (Robison-Cox,
1999, p. 82). Others have constructed similar practical activities (Richardson & Haller, 2003) and
used information technology to attempt to illuminate the nature of a confidence interval (Bertie
& Farrington, 2003; Cumming, 2007).
MATHEMATICAL DEFINITIONS
Mathematical definitions, viewed as statements about what some mathematical object or idea is,
are a vital aspect of learning mathematics (Morgan, 2005). It might seem that the teacher has
little option but to give definitions to students and that students have little option but to accept
them without argument. Hewitt (2001) distinguished between the arbitrary and the necessary
in the learning of mathematics and advocates telling students things that are mathematically
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arbitrary (e.g., what we mean by the word mean) but actively avoiding telling students anything
that is mathematically necessary (e.g., what happens to the overall mean when two data sets of
known mean are combined). Real mathematics concerns establishing the necessary, and educators
committed nontrivially to constructivism will insist that this should be done by learners and not
for them. On this basis, the definition of a confidence interval could be seen as an arbitrary fact,
and students might simply be told a good definition and asked to remember and use it.
However, definitions are not always simply arbitrary statements that need to be remembered;
frequently they need to be worked on in order to be understood. Tall and Vinner (1981) used
the term concept definition to describe “a form of words used to specify [a] concept” (p. 152).
The concept definition is a formal and mathematically accurate statement, given by the teacher
or developed from student discussion, that accords with that accepted in the wider mathematical
community. They contrasted this with what they call the concept image, by which they mean
“the total cognitive structure” that a student associates with a concept, including “all the mental
pictures and associated properties and processes” (p. 152). When absorbed in the details of a
mathematical problem, the student may find that it is the concept image, rather than the concept
definition, that controls their thoughts and actions. Tall and Vinner (1981) highlighted possible
conflicts between the two, which may be completely unrecognized by the student. Vinner (1991)
commented that:
There is no harm if the students memorize the formal definition and repeat it in various occasions.
. . . But [the teacher or textbook writer] should have no illusions about the cognitive power that this
definition has on the student’s mathematical thinking. (p. 80)
Although students may have been given a sound definition by the teacher, what they have in
fact understood by it—or take it to be in practice—may be quite different.
Edwards and Ward (2004) contrasted what I would term descriptive and prescriptive def-
initions. They compared Landau’s (2001, p. 165) “extracted definitions,” which are descrip-
tive definitions reflecting the way words are actually used in practice, with Robinson’s (1954,
p. 59) “stipulative definitions,” which are prescriptive—imposed with a clear intention that others
should follow them. Edwards and Ward (2004) “think of mathematical definitions as stipulated,
whereas most ‘everyday language’ definitions are extracted” (p. 412), thereby identifying stipu-
lative definitions with Tall and Vinner’s (1981) concept definitions. When students are supplied
with mathematical definitions, it is frequently with purposes in mind that may not yet be easily
communicated to them. A mathematics lecturer may say, “Suppose we define . . .” and then go
on to make a definition that may seem very odd until its consequences are explored. Definitions
may be set up to avoid problems of which the student thus far has no experience or to create a
distinction between the object being studied and something else that they have not yet learned
about. Alcock and Simpson (2002) described “working from definitions” (p. 32) as an aspect of
studying university mathematics that contrasts sharply with many students’ typical experiences
in school.
THE STUDY
I carried out a small-scale exploratory research study in order to examine these issues further. In
particular, the questions I sought to answer were the following:
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1. To what extent do mathematics teachers see the description of confidence intervals as
potentially problematic?
2. Do they regard particular formulations as revealing or contributing to misconceptions?
3. What particular forms of words do they regard as correct or incorrect?
The research participants were a convenience sample of 12 high school and college teachers
of mathematics that I knew personally through mathematics teacher conferences. I sent each
person a brief questionnaire by e-mail. Although this by no means constitutes a random sample
of mathematics teachers, it did ensure that I obtained a 100% return rate, and the teachers included
covered a range of different backgrounds and experiences. However, the small sample size means
that any conclusions drawn must be tentative and can be indicative only.
The questionnaire consisted of four statements about a 95% confidence interval and asked
the participants which of these they thought were correct or incorrect and whether they had any
alternative formulations or comments about misconceptions or any difficulties associated with
teaching confidence intervals. The four statements were as follows:
A About 95% of the time the true population mean lies inside the confidence interval.
B I’m 95% sure that the confidence interval contains the true population mean.
C The probability that the true population mean is within the confidence interval is 95%.
D There is a 95% chance that the true population mean is inside the confidence interval.
These statements were designed to draw out from the participants their views about the
correctness or incorrectness of particular aspects of their formulation. Statement A takes an
objective, long-term average, frequency perspective, whereas statement B presents the matter in
a more subjective way, with a personal pronoun and the notion of being 95% sure. Statements
B–D focus on one particular confidence interval, whereas statement A appears to suggest the
existence of a (large enough) set of them. Statement C explicitly invokes the probability of
the true population mean lying within a certain range—something that is generally seen as
problematic within the literature. The purpose of this statement was to see the participants’
reactions to a classic instance of what is widely regarded as a misconception. Statement D was
intended to be a less familiar wording (a concealed version) of something very similar in content
to statement C. Would more teachers reject C, perhaps due to its familiarity as a commonly
presented misconception, than the less easily recognized D?
No participant saw any other participant’s responses. Two participants followed up their
initial e-mail response 2 days later (Respondent 1) and 3 days later (Respondent 4) with further
thoughts, which were also included in the analysis. The extent to which respondents discussed the
matter with colleagues outside this study, or consulted textbooks or other resources, is unknown.
However, I would suggest that the likelihood is minimal for a busy teacher on a working school
day responding within a few hours to an informal e-mail enquiry.
All respondents were aware of difficulties associated with how students expressed the meaning
of confidence intervals and seemed to regard certain formulations, especially statement B, as rep-
resenting a common misconception. They reported treading carefully and warning their students
exactly how to describe confidence intervals; particularly what not to say, often with reference to
examiners’ expectations. For example, Respondent 1 commented that “The examiner does ask for
the meaning of a confidence interval as a standard question in S3 [a ‘Further Mathematics’ unit
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in the UK A-level Further Mathematics qualification] and he definitely doesn’t like answers like
B, C or D.” Respondent 2 gave a typical answer, also concluding with what examiners require:
I think that the issue is that there is nothing special about any particular confidence interval. It is
based on one particular sample and another sample would produce a different confidence interval.
You would expect that 95% of intervals constructed in this way will contain the mean. I think that is
the sort of statement that [is] expected in exams.
In a high-stakes examination culture, what examiners want or expect is frequently taken as
final.
Although all of the participants contacted were experienced teachers of mathematics, three
hedged their responses to some degree. For example, Respondent 2 bracketed his comments with
“It’s been some time since I taught this topic but” and “but as I say I am rather out of touch!”
Respondent 3 did something similar, with
I have only in recent years studied and certainly only ever taught hypothesis testing in the S2 [the
second statistics unit in the A-level course in the UK] sense. So it could be that below is referring to
something that I have only possibly never looked into properly (I’d need to go to the exact definition
etc.) . . . But I think you are asking something different which is beyond S2?
The other nine respondents seemed to offer more confident answers, although there was a
general sense that my question was a difficult one in a complex area.
Two respondents did not see important differences between the statements. Respondent 1
commented, “I think that A is closest to what I teach. I usually say ‘95% of confidence intervals
constructed in this way will contain the mean,”’ not seeming to ascribe importance to any
differences between their formulation and statement A. This was followed with a conventional
explanation:
Remember that the mean is fixed and each time we take a sample and work out an interval, we get a
different interval. On 95% of those occasions we will have successfully trapped the mean inside our
interval.
Two days later, the same participant sent a follow-up e-mail:
Thinking about this again, perhaps B is acceptable too. What we need to remember is that the mean
is fixed and has no probability attached to it. The probability is attached to the interval so the wording
of B is acceptable but not C or D. (Respondent 1, 2 days later)
Respondent 4 also regarded some of the differences as unimportant (e.g., “C and D are just
semantics”). Initially this respondent was uncertain about statement B but sent a second e-mail,
3 days later, with a different conclusion; almost exactly opposite to the point of view of Respondent
1:
Doesn’t it depend if you look at it from a frequentist or Bayesian [point] of view? Either way, clearly
B is subjective, so not really provable (thus not true, I guess. It depends what info you knew at the
start.) (Respondent 4)
B is true—it is how you define a [confidence interval] but C and D are just semantics, so I think fine
as well. I think C and D say the same thing as B really. A is too imprecise to be correct or incorrect.
(Respondent 4, 3 days later)
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These changing opinions seemed to indicate uncertainty over what was correct, even among
these experienced, highly competent classroom practitioners.
Half of the respondents found statement A acceptable and statement B was rejected by three-
quarters, yet Richardson and Haller (2003), for instance, seemed to accept phrases such as “90%
confident” while adhering to the standard line, commenting that:
if we claim that we are 90% confident that a proportion lies within the endpoints of a confidence
interval, we are saying that the endpoints of the confidence interval were calculated by a method that
gives correct results in 90% of all possible samples. We cannot say that the probability is 90% that the
true proportion falls within the endpoints of the confidence interval. No randomness remains after we
draw one particular sample and construct from it one particular interval. The true proportion either is
or is not between the confidence interval endpoints. (p. 8)
One respondent accepted D but not C on the grounds that “You can’t talk about the probability
of the population mean being something, because it is fixed,” and one rejected all four, substituting
his own statement involving references to taking lots of samples in which 95% of them contained
(or caught) the population mean. I obtained the impression that some of the teachers navigated
this area by having one and only one way of expressing the matter, which they had thought about
and were sure (or had been told) was correct, and were uncertain about the accuracy of any
alternative. They therefore did not wish to accept any statement different from the one that they
were most used to and comfortable with. For example:
C is wrong. I might accept A but I don’t like any of the others. Since Mu [the population mean]
is fixed and M [the sample mean] is a random variable these statements should be about a random
measurement M and not a fixed value Mu. I would accept: “The probability that the random interval
(calculated from a sample value M) contains the value of Mu is 0.95” but not: “The probability that
Mu lies inside the . . . interval is 0.95.” (Respondent 5)
It would seem from this exploratory study that mathematics teachers do recognize the po-
tentially problematic nature of the way in which confidence intervals are described and may
be led by habit or by the publicized expectations of examiners to prefer particular forms of
wordings—and consequently to pass them on to their students. However, at least among these re-
search participants, there was little consensus regarding which of my statements were acceptable
or unacceptable. A rough summary of their overall responses is given in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Respondents’ Conclusions (n = 12)
Statement Considered acceptable Considered unacceptable Ambivalent or no opinion clearly stated
A 6 1 5
B 0 9 3
C 2 4 6
D 2 3 7
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DISCUSSION
The two statements:
• “The population mean lies within the confidence interval” and
• “The confidence interval contains the population mean”
would seem at face value to be linguistically equivalent, just as “The milk is in the fridge” and
“The fridge contains the milk” are. To say that the first implies that the population mean is
changing whereas the second implies that the confidence interval is changing seems unwarranted.
Would we assume that the milk is mobile in the first statement but that the fridge is in the second?
However, it must be admitted that “The fridge contains the milk” does sound unusual and might
well cause us to question why the statement was being made that way round. Mathematical
language needs to be both logically sound and conventionally acceptable.
Nonetheless, in the case where we take just one sample, and so obtain just one confidence
interval, it would appear that we simply have two quantities—an unknown population mean
and a known interval. Whether the population mean lies within the confidence interval or not
depends on the relative location of the two things, not simply on one or the other. Treating the
population mean as though it could take various values (an unknown variable) is not necessarily
absurd; indeed, when finding maximum likelihood estimators, for instance, the population mean
is tacitly treated as a variable, to the extent that differentiation is performed with respect to it. It
might also be felt from an epistemological perspective that the notion of “fixed but unknown” is
potentially problematic, because on what basis can we know that the population mean is fixed if
it is completely unknown?
If saying that the population mean lies in the confidence interval is exactly equivalent to saying
that the confidence interval contains the population mean, then we can label this event as X and
recast the four statements A–D above as A′–D′ below:
A′ About 95% of the time X.
B ′ I’m 95% sure that X.
C ′ The probability that X is 95%.
D′ There is a 95% chance that X.
When written in this way, they might indeed all appear to be conceptually equivalent, if “95%
of the time,” “95% sure,” “probability is 95%,” and “95% chance” all mean the same as “95%
confident.” Nevertheless, that does not mean that they necessarily have identical effects on the
reader. Moreover, A′ is a frequency statement, whereas B ′ is a more subjective one, which might
not be regarded as the same by everyone, as I discuss below.
CONCLUSION
Many teachers would regard it as important for students to recognize that the population mean
is fixed but unknown, whereas the limits of the confidence interval depend on the nature of
the particular sample taken. Cumming (2007) defended cumbersome phrasing, commenting that
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“The wording used . . . is meant to remind us that it’s the intervals that vary, and any probability
refers to what happens in the long run in the set of all intervals” (p. 91). Typically, statistics texts
are careful with their language; for example, Garner (2010) explained as follows:
We identify a confidence level for this interval, usually 95% or 99%, meaning that, in the large number
of samples we might use to construct an interval, the true population value will fall into the interval
95% (or 99%) of the time. The procedure, if it were repeated over and over again, would ‘catch’ the
population value in 95% (or 99%) of the attempts. (p. 130)
However, less precise (arguably more intuitive) explanations are also common, such as this
from Woodbury (2002):
The confidence interval tells us that we are 95% sure that the true mean age for all college statistics
students is in between 21.67 and 23.73 years old. There is a 5% chance that the mean is not in this
interval . . . (p. 313)
This is reminiscent of Fidler’s (2006) students, who expressed being “95% confident that the
population mean would lie in this interval” (p. 206). Similarly, Cohen, Manion, and Morrison
(2011) wrote that:
The confidence level, usually expressed as a percentage (usually 95 per cent or 99 per cent), is an
index of how sure we can be . . . that the responses lie within a given variation range. The confidence
interval is that degree of variation or variation range . . . that one wishes to ensure. (p. 145)
It is questionable whether these more user-friendly formulations do real damage to students’
understandings or indeed say anything inaccurate about the situation. Suppose that a fair coin is
thrown, caught, and covered before anyone sees. Whether it is heads or tails is fixed and cannot be
changed, yet because we lack knowledge we say that the probability of heads is 0.5, because we
know that 50% of the time it will be heads. It is unclear how this is any different from saying that
we do not know whether the population mean lies within our confidence interval, but we know
that in the long run it will 95% of the time, so we say that it does with probability 95%. Saying
that the population mean must be either inside or outside the interval (it is all or nothing) is no
different from saying that one throw of a coin must be either completely heads or completely tails.
This idea of a fixed but unknown situation has some resonances with the paradox of Schro¨dinger’s
cat (Gribbin, 2012).
Precision may be a good course for the teacher, but expecting students to parrot their formu-
lations is likely to be counterproductive. According to Sfard (1992), “For an abstract object to be
born, a long period of incubation may sometimes be necessary” (p. 83). She shows that trying to
force a structural perspective on students can lead to the creation of superficial pseudo-objects,
which are not well supported by understanding. If students have had the opportunity to build
up the imagery and network of ideas expressed by well-thought-out phrasing, through engaging
with appropriate activities, then it does make sense for them to work on expressing such ideas
accurately and in ways that capture essential aspects of them. However, forcing students into
formal articulations of confidence intervals that they do not own might fail to influence any
deeper understanding. It might be good pedagogic practice for the teacher to emphasize active
verbs, such as in saying that “the confidence interval captures the population mean,” to try to
indicate what is going on in a dynamic manner, but it would be inadvisable to create a shibboleth
for students over particular forms of words.
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What students say and what students think are not simply related. Edwards and Ward (2004)
commented that:
It is not uncommon for students (or any person for that matter) to repeat something they have
heard without full understanding. For instance, students may say, perhaps to please instructors, that
“mathematics is necessary in all walks of life,” without being able to give one meaningful example
beyond the day-to-day interactions involved in commerce. (p. 414)
If students give explanations mechanistically, this is unlikely to help them in the process of
developing their nonverbal concept images. If a student is simply told “never say the probability
is 0.95 that the mean lies in a 95% confidence interval for the mean” (Dillon, 2011, p. 34), they
may assent without modifying their concept image and thus continue to think of the confidence
interval in exactly the same way. The consequence of a fascist “word police” agenda is that
confidence intervals become a minefield through which students (and sometimes teachers) step
with lack of confidence. Smith et al. (1993) stressed the need to “conceptualize learning in terms
of refinement rather than replacement” (p. 150) of students’ preconceptions, commenting that “it
is the nature of mathematical and scientific knowledge that the most elegant and valued expression
consists of very general, compact, and abstract propositions” (p. 150), and we must not assume
that this can be achieved quickly by brute force. It is likely to be more effective to work willingly
with students’ current conceptions as they are, rather than to attempt to impose something that is
quite alien to them.
For some educators, the only solution is to teach statistics from a Bayesian perspective, even
at an elementary level (Berry, 1997). Jackman (2009), for example, located the problem within
the frequentist paradigm:
One often heard interpretation of the 95% confidence interval . . . is “there is a .95 probability that
µ lies between $40 000 and $50 000.” . . . From the frequentist perspective, the statement . . . is
valid, since for frequentists “probability” is at least tacitly understood to mean “relative frequency in
repeated sampling.” But this is not how most practitioners use confidence intervals. Rather, subjective
statements of the sort “I am 95% sure that µ ∈ [$40 000, $50 000]” are quite typical. . . . Alas,
the correct frequentist interpretation is the less helpful statement about the performance of the 95%
confidence interval in repeated sampling. This leads to considerable confusion, and frankly, makes
teaching and learning statistics harder than it should be. (p. xxxiii)
Bayarri and Berger (2004) took the view that “one can teach much of elementary statistics
from [the Bayesian] perspective, without changing the procedures that are taught” (p. 63). Howell
(2013) confessed that he has “worried and fussed” (p. 193) over how to present the meaning of a
95% confidence interval, saying that “in some ways the argument is very petty and looks like we
are needlessly splitting hairs” (p. 194). In the end, however, he too sided “for teaching purposes”
with the Bayesians, since “Going with the traditionalists requires such convoluted sentences that
you look like you are trying to confuse rather than clarify” (p. 194). Some authors, such as
Masson and Loftus (2003) seem to be attempting to combine to the two perspectives by saying,
for example, that:
there is a 95% probability that the interval is one of the 95% of all possible confidence intervals that
includes the population mean. Put more simply, in the absence of any other information, there is a
95% probability that the obtained confidence interval includes the population mean. (p. 204)
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It is clear that various approaches are possible, and teachers of statistics might like to reflect
on their own concept images for the notion of a confidence interval and to consider ways in
which they might choose to word the definition for students. Students could be provided with
opportunities to consider different mathematical definitions and to explore how different wordings
might highlight different, perhaps unintended, properties or features. In the end, whatever view
teachers take, definitional ambiguity can be seen as an opportunity for clarifying thinking through
discussion (Foster, 2011) rather than for imposing an inflexible mantra and declaring all else
heretical.
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